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CLONING FREEDOM:
CRIMINALIZATION OR EMPOWERMENT
IN REPRODUCTIVE POLICY?
ROBERT C.L. MOFFAT'
I. INTRODUCTION
In his nightmares, Leon Kass envisions a couple arriving at their friendly
corner cloning parlor pleading, "Could we have a clone, please?"' Because a
clone is simply more of the same, we could even hear in our mind's ear their
plaintive tone, reminiscent of Oliver Twist asking for more. Many in the
contemporary debate about cloning are saying that the couple should never,
under any circumstance, be granted their wish. Not only do the enemies of
cloning contend that cloning is entirely unethical, they also believe that it should
be made illegal.
For example, the well-publicized medical ethicist Arthur Caplan states his
belief that cloning "would make doing anything in humans beyond unethical-it
would be criminal."2 Some legislators wish to make sure that criminal penalties
are as harsh as possible. Immediately after the cloning of Dolly the sheep was
announced, Florida legislator Alex Villalobos rushed to file a bill that would
make any use of human DNA in medical research a crime. He demonstrated
the seriousness of his intentions by asking that the practice be declared a first
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degree felony punishable by thirty years in prison. His proposed bill was so
broad that it would have criminalized work that is presently being done in many
places in which bits of human DNA are used in a wide range of scientific
research .
3
Before we sign on to this ardent campaign for expansion of the criminal
law, wisdom dictates that we ask a few questions. Are there pressing reasons
to believe that cloning is a threat of such a magnitude that prompt and drastic
action is imperative? How persuasive are the justifications offered for restricting
freedom by criminalizing cloning? How do the claimed benefits compare with
the costs entailed in such an expansion of the criminal law? Are there
countervailing reasons in favor of expanding rather than restricting freedom?
This Article takes up these questions in the order presented.
II. How BIG A THREAT IS CLONING?
Leon Kass envisions a wide variety of potential uses and users of human
cloning. For example, he imagines
providing a child for an infertile couple; "replacing" a beloved spouse
or child who is dying or has died; avoiding the risk of genetic disease;
permitting reproduction for homosexual men and lesbians who want
nothing sexual to do with the opposite sex; securing a genetically
identical source of organs or tissues perfectly suitable for
transplantation; getting a child with a genotype of one's own choosing,
not excluding oneself; replicating individuals of great genius, talent or
beauty-having a child who really could "be like Mike"; and creating
large sets of genetically identical humans suitable for research on, for
instance, the question of nature versus nurture, or for special missions
in peace and war (not excluding espionage), in which using identical
humans would be an advantage.4
But how realistic is this vast array of imagined uses? Are we really on the
verge of catastrophe? Is cloning, once the techniques are perfected and the
procedure is actually available, likely to be frequent? I very seriously doubt it.
We tend to forget that cloning is simply a variant version of in vitro fertilization
(IVF). Therefore, it is going to share the characteristics of existing procedures
of artificial reproduction. I have never heard any couple say they were glad
they had to undergo such a procedure in order to try to produce a child. Why?
3. Cloning Bill Would Put Clamp on DNA Research, GAINESVILLE SUN, Mar. 8, 1997, at 2B
[hereinafter Cloning Bill].
4. Kass, supra note 1, at 19.
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The procedures are expensive, time-consuming, and difficult . Those who do
go through it report emotional and physical exhaustion. And, on top of all that,
cloning lacks even the mystery of other artificial reproductive procedures as to
what the product of the painful and laborious process might turn out to be.
Kass worries that wealthy persons will choose to maintain a clone in a
permanent vegetative state as a source of spare parts. How likely is such a
replay of the movie Coma? Should we really anticipate Intensive Care Units
filled with clones waiting to supply the needs of their twins for body organs?
Persons who imagine such a scene cannot have checked the cost of care in the
ICU recently, since it is prohibitively expensive. In any event, cloning
researchers are excited about the prospects for their research, because they
expect to be able to develop the capacity to reproduce tissues and organs using
cloning technology. Maintaining entire bodies would be needlessly wasteful.
Not only will they be able to provide organ replacement on demand, they
anticipate regenerating brain tissue to help Parkinson's patients whose hopes now
rest on scarce fetal tissue. 6
Does that mean there are no situations in which we could expect cloning to
be appealing? To this point, I have been able to come up with only two such
cases. One would be when IVF procedures cannot be employed using the genes
of both parents, because the father's sperm or the mother's eggs are not suitable
or are unavailable. In such cases, it must be conceded that at least some parents
may choose to clone one of themselves rather than introduce genes foreign to
one or both parents into their child.
The other case that seems to present a situation that would make cloning
rational was suggested by Ward Cassells, Chief of Cardiology at the University
of Texas Medical School. He imagines that parents with a child stricken with
leukemia might eagerly choose to clone the child in order to produce a younger
twin who could provide a perfect bone marrow match. 7 Such a prophecy is not
at all surprising. There have been cases in the past where parents conceived an
additional child in hopes of providing a bone marrow match for their sick child.
Apart from such rare cases, I have been unable to discover others in which there
would be rational appeal to reproducing something that you already have rather
than enjoying the mystery of what a couple might produce in the genetic lottery.
5. For example, the cost is more than $16,000 for a single attempt at pregnancy with sperm and
egg donors. Infertile Couples 'Adopt' Embryos, Choose Traits, GAINESVILLE SUN, Nov. 23, 1997,
at 6A (The New York Times) [hereinafter Infertile Couples].
6. Cloning's Real Benefit Lies Ahead, GAINESVILLE SUN, Apr. 10, 1997, at 6A.
7. Debate Keeps Raging over Cloning, GAINESVILLE SUN, Apr. 7, 1997, at 8A [hereinafter
Debate Keeps Raging].
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I conclude that, if available, the cloning of humans would be utilized, but
only in a very small number of cases. Hence, I find it a highly dubious
proposition that there are good reasons to believe that cloning is a threat of great
magnitude demanding prompt and drastic action.
III. THE UNEASY CASE FOR RESTRICTING FREEDOM
Can there be any doubt that the proponents of criminalization wish to
restrict freedom? Not at all. Kass is quite forthright in his attack on what he
views as an unwarranted expansion of reproductive freedom. Moreover, he
makes it clear that he believes such freedom has already been expanded beyond
justification. He says:
The principle of reproductive freedom as currently enunciated by
the proponents of cloning logically embraces the ethical acceptability
of sliding down the entire rest of the slope-to producing children
• . . whose entire genetic makeup will be the product of parental
eugenic planning and choice.'
We may note in passing that Kass shares with the radical exponents of such
freedom the assumption that reproduction is solely an individual right. It is
important to remember that an alternative view is that reproduction is a practice
which, responsibly conducted, benefits society. A number of reasons can be
offered in support of such a view, beginning with the obvious one that, without
reproduction, society would cease to exist. It is important to keep this social
perspective in mind, because it frequently provides the most persuasive reasons
supporting the criminal law.
Conventional wisdom in the architecture of expansions of the criminal law
places the burden on those in favor of criminalizing behavior that has up to now
been legally permitted. Traditionally, the arguments that endeavor to bear that
burden are couched in terms of harms or injuries to others. In its earliest
efforts, the criminal law sought to put an end to the blood feud by making
murder criminal.9 Subsequent expansion included physical threats of injury and
eventually came to include protection of property as well, since efforts to take
property illegally can so often lead to physical violence and thereby threaten
public order.'o In all these cases, the justification for making behavior criminal
is clearly harm to others.
8. Kass, supra note 1, at 24.
9. See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 237 (1978).
10. WAYNE LAFAVE & AusTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 702-03 (2d ed. 1986).
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A. Applying the Harm Principle
The notion of harm to others as the foundation of the criminal law has a
long history. However, it was made truly famous when John Stuart Mill in his
best-known work, the Essay on Liberty, made it the centerpiece of his
philosophical argument. There he declared:
[Tihe sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, whether
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others,
to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or
entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any
evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which
it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to
someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he
is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
absolute. I
Although there has been considerable debate, especially since the Report of
the Wolfenden Commission in England in 1957,12 as to the precise meaning of
Mill's harm principle, it marks an obvious beginning point for discussion of any
issue of criminalization. In addressing the issue of cloning, proponents of
criminalization are rather silent regarding harm to others. The reasons are
obvious. It is rather difficult to find the person who is harmed by the practice
of cloning. In fact, the only available candidate is the twin created by the
cloning process. Kass argues: "Such an arrangement is profoundly
dehumanizing, no matter how good the product. Mass-scale cloning of the same
individual makes the point vividly; but the violation of human equality, freedom
and dignity are present even in a single planned clone." 3 But is it realistic to
anticipate complaints from the twinned person of wrongful birth on the mere
grounds that she shares the identical genes of some previously existing person?
11. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 73
(Everyman's Library ed. 1950).
12. WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND
PROSTITUTION Cmd. 247 (1957).
13. Kass, supra note 1, at 23.
_A_
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Consider the cases mentioned above in which I believe cloning might be
rationally appealing to prospective parents. In the case of the child conceived
to produce a bone marrow match, some critics object, in a naive form of
Kantianism, that the younger child is being treated solely as a means to an
end. 4 When the child grows up and learns the story of her place in the
family, will she feel that she was created only to be used as an instrumentality?
Actual experience with such situations indicates that the child is loved not only
as a member of the family, but is valued even more as the one who saved the
life of the older sibling. In other words, the child is loved for herself and also
for her enormous contribution to the welfare and happiness of the family.
In the second case, the cloned child is chosen to be a member of the family
in place of another IVF child who would have shared fewer or no genes with the
parents. I do not know how parents explain the absence of genetic connection
to such a child produced with donated sperm and/or egg. Presumably, the
explanation would run somewhat parallel to the explanation proffered to an
adopted child, i.e., that we wanted you. However, it would seem somewhat
easier for parents in such nonconventional situations to explain their motivation
in deciding on a clone in preference to offspring less closely related to them
from a genetic standpoint. In any event, it seems hard to imagine why a cloned
child would feel a greater basis for objection than children with little or no
genetic relationship to the parents. What does seem quite evident is that any
arguments against cloning based on direct harm to others are both quite
speculative and far from concrete.
B. Harming Oneself
Proving that there is no harm to others is insufficient to make one's case
against criminalization in the twentieth century. Our society has seen fit to
criminalize a variety of behaviors because we believe that the individual should
be protected from herself. Such grounds are typically designated paternalism,
although maternalism could be an equally appropriate label. Paternalism may
justify punishing riding in a car without the seat belt fastened, the helmetless
riding of a motorcycle, or possessing a wide variety of controlled substances.
The reason given for such criminal restriction of freedom is that, if individuals
were really aware of the nature of their disastrous courses of conduct, they
would not do them. If individuals are unaware or are acting irrationally, society
is warranted in intervening and trying to prevent those persons from making a
big mistake. Although such an eminent authority as H.L.A. Hart feels that
14. The reverend Richard McCormick, a Jesuit theologian at Notre Dame, states flatly that "No
human being is a means to another person's purposes. We stand with our own human dignity before
God." Ostrom, supra note 2, at 6D.
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paternalism can provide justification for criminal proscription, 5 paternalism has
been highly controversial, except among legislators. Commentators recognize
the great danger of overreaching on the part of the state. Even Gerald Dworkin,
who accepts paternalism on the ground that it can sometimes provide a coherent
justification for criminalization, believes that it should be employed with extreme
caution. 16
Could the cloning of whole human beings be prohibited on grounds of
paternalism? The justifications are far from apparent. If there are insufficient
reasons for prohibiting the practice based on harm to the clone herself, then it
seems well nigh impossible to see what paternalism could add that would be
relevant to the debate. It is certainly true that some critics would wish to
counsel the prospective parents against cloning. It is even possible that some of
those counsels would touch on paternalistic reasons. However, it seems clear
that the primary thrust of such arguments is more indirect than those offered by
paternalism.
C. Exploring Secondary Harms
A more frequent justification for criminal law when harm to others is not
shown is that government should intervene in order to protect society as a whole
from secondary harms. The reason for calling them secondary is that they are
indirect, because no specific person is injured even though the community as a
whole may suffer in some way. The late John Kaplan identified four secondary
harms. 17 Society may be harmed because other individuals in society may
"model" the behavior of the cloner. In a somewhat similar vein, society may
claim the "categorical imperative" on the basis that, if some individuals engage
in cloning, then everyone will want to follow suit and start cloning too, and
"what would happen to society then?" Although some critics such as Kass seem
to imagine that society might go on a cloning binge, I am greatly doubtful that
would happen. I have already mentioned reasons why I believe the practice,
even if available, would be quite rare.
Two slightly more specific secondary harms are the "non-support"
justification and the "public ward" justification. Non-support would apply to the
substance addict who by indulging renders himself unable. to fulfill his
responsibilities to care for those who are dependent upon his support.
Obviously, that justification would not apply to the clone. There is, of course,
the possibility that a clone could in rare instances become a public ward,
15. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 30-34 (1963).
16. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 125-26 (Richard A.
Wasserstrom ed., 1971).
17. John Kaplan, The Role of the Law in Drug Control, 1971 DuKE L.J. 1065, 1066-67.
1998] 589
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dependent upon the state. That eventuality is presently possible for offspring
conceived in any fashion. At the moment, we do not means-test procreation in
any way. I cannot see any justification for singling out cloned offspring for
different treatment. In the future, when we do apply means-testing to
procreative decisions in general, it would also be appropriate to apply those
same limits to cloned progeny as well. Because the process is expensive in
itself, we should not anticipate that parents without adequate means will attempt
to clone their offspring.
D. Public Harms
The claim of various sorts of public harms has been by far the most
controversial source of justifications proffered in support of criminal laws. The
reason is that public harms are by their very nature the most abstract, indirect,
and ephemeral in character. For that same reason, they are also the most easily
abused either through simple overreaching of the criminal law or, in too many
aggravated cases, through the stigmatization of practices of minority subcultures
for political advantage. Such abuses have been well-documented in the literature
on policing1 8 and in a variety of sociological studies of reform movements.19
Nonetheless, there are at least two respected sources of theories of public
harm as a justification for criminalization. Lord Patrick Devlin propounds the
social disintegration thesis. Professor Herbert Hart offers the notion of public
nuisance as a suitable ground for justifying criminal law. Each of these theories
appears to have parallels in reasons that are being offered to justify making
cloning criminal.
1. The Social Disintegration Thesis
Lord Devlin argued that society has a right and a need to enforce its
existing morality in order to prevent social disintegration.2" The test he
proposed to determine if the morality of a society is sufficiently fundamental that
enforcement is necessary is whether the practice in question provokes such
indignation and disgust that a random jury would agree that it is beyond the
bounds of toleration. In focusing on the idea of repugnance, Leon Kass offers
a highly similar argument. Indeed, some of his language suggests that he fears
18. See, e.g., JEROME SKOLNICK, THE POLICE AND THE URBAN GHETTO 26-28 (1968)
(describing the "blind pig" as a locus of police harassment of minorities).
19. See, e.g., JOSEPH GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963).
20. Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence of the
British Academy (Mar. 18, 1959), reprinted as Morals and the Criminal Law, in PATRICK DEVLIN,
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 1-25 (1965).
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the disintegration of society if cloning is legally permitted. Certainly, his notion
of repugnance sounds very much like Devlin's moral disgust." Whatever
weight repugnance might carry as an argument for the moment, it is worthwhile
to remember that disgust did not prove to be a powerful seat of argument for
Devlin after all. Why? If the social disgust atrophies, then it disappears as a
ground for legislation action.
Devlin himself provided an example of that erosion of moral ground. In
his original 1957 essay, he argued against the adoption of the recommendations
of the Wolfenden Commission that private homosexual behavior between
consenting adults should be decriminalized. Subsequently, in 1965, he wrote a
letter on that subject to The Times, the accepted way for a public figure in
England to make a public statement. In the letter, he announced a change in his
view. He now supported the recommendations of the Commission and believed
that adult private consensual homosexuality should no longer be criminalized.
He felt that by that point in time public opinion had shifted in such a way that
it no longer met his disgust criterion.' Thus, the response to Professor Kass'
ground of repugnance is that it carries some weight only until the public gets
used to the idea. When the idea no longer engenders disgust or repugnance, that
ground disappears. That sort of evolution is common. Initially, public reaction
to many scientific innovations is one of disgust, as was the case with IVF and
many other procedures when they were first publicized. Repugnance or disgust
in many cases seems to be really just a form of temporary social hysteria. One
could argue that we ought to be trying to resist such hysteria.23 In any event,
repugnance appears unlikely to provide a long-lasting basis for opposition to
cloning or to much of anything else.
2. Cloning as Public Nuisance
In addition to other justifications, H.L.A. Hart accepts nuisance as a
possible ground for criminal proscription, for example of bigamous marriage.24
That ground has also proven problematic, but it does suggest the kind of public
harm that some critics of cloning seek to invoke. As noted above, Kass rests
his opposition primarily on his notion of repugnance, which seems to suggest
elements of Devlin's fear of social disintegration. Certainly, his terminology is
21. "In crucial cases, however, repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond
reason's power fully to articulate it." Kass, supra note 1, at 20.
22. See Letter of Devlin and Other Lords to the TIMES (London), May 11, 1965, at 13.
23. See Robert C.L. Moffat, Cloning Hysteria: Can We Accept a Revolutionary Role for Science
in the Human Future?, in REVOLUTIONS, INSITrUTIONS, LAW 127-49 (Joel Levin & Roberta
Kevelson eds., 1998). The chapter cited provides the basis for the present treatment at certain
points, principally in sections IV and V infra.
24. HART, supra note 15, at 38-43.
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more colorful than either Devlin's or Hart's. But his repugnance also seems
quite similar to Hart's public nuisance, since his grounds for claiming
repugnance amount to the idea that cloning (as with Hart's idea of bigamy)
would work mischief within the social fabric.' Hence, if it constitutes any
kind of harm, the claimed harm would have to be public in nature.
Public harm clearly seems to be the nature of Kass' claim. He sees cloning
as perhaps the greatest threat to human civilization in its entire history. He talks
about cloning as a "narcissistic self-re-creation."26 He assumes throughout that
the essence of human nature is genes, an assumption that may be less surprising
in light of his background as a scientist. But we must recognize that his
arguments are premised on that assumption: that human identity is biological in
nature.' He speaks repeatedly of the genotype: "the natural grounding of
kinship,"28 and "flesh of their flesh."29 He presents a highly emotive
evocation of good old fashioned unplanned human reproduction. Indeed, one
is often tempted to wonder if his main complaint regards reproductive planning
of any sort. But his claim does raise interesting and important questions.
Presumably, although he is not really clear about it, the public nuisance that
cloning would produce would be a reduction in new genetic combinations and
a stagnation of society, because too many persons would be mere replications
of past ones.
Such possible claims merit our serious consideration. Kass' emphasis on
genes is reminiscent of the sociobiological argument that a species will attempt
to secure its genetic survival, even to the point of one member of the herd
sacrificing itself in order to save the rest. Indeed, the sociobiologists can cite
some fascinating behaviors in support of their thesis. However, when we turn
our attention to the human realm of the animal kingdom, even though bloodlines
may still be important, cultural factors enter into the picture. For example, we
should recall that Sir Henry Sumner Maine claimed, more than a century ago,
that the most significant invention in the growth of human societies was the legal
25. "[R]epugnance may be the only voice left that speaks up to defend the central core of our
humanity. Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder." Kass, supra note 1, at 20.
26. "Thanks to modem notions of individualism and the rate of cultural change, we see
ourselves not as linked to ancestors and defined by traditions, but as projects for our own self-
creation, not only as self-made men but also man-made selves; and self-cloning is simply an
extension of such rootless and narcissistic self-re-creation." Id. at 18.
27. "These biological truths about our origins foretell deep truths about our identity and about
our human condition altogether." Id. at 21.
28. "What would kinship be without its clear natural grounding? And what would identity be
without kinship?" Id. at 21.
29. Id. at 22.
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fiction of adoption. 3' Adoption was a way of bringing someone who was not
genetically related into membership in the family, clan, or tribe. The wonders
of culture are demonstrated in the fact that this legal fiction led to the adopted
person being treated as a blood relative. That is only one small example of the
power of culture in human societies. We are thoroughly familiar with the
phenomenon of brother fighting against brother in civil wars and other deadly
conflicts. We also know that spouses often remain more loyal to their spouses
than to their genetically-related families. Bonds of culture frequently outweigh
those of genes.
Continuing within the framework of biological argument, Kass argues that
the practice of cloning would make breeding entirely instrumental in nature.
When we stop to think about it, we realize that viewing marriage and offspring
from an instrumental perspective has essentially been the worldwide standard up
until the last hundred years or so when in the West the novel idea of romantic
love as the basis for reproduction entered into the picture. But does that prove
Kass' point? Not really. Though kinship factors were occasionally important,
the dominant factor in arranged marriages has not been the genetic component.
What has mattered is the cultural component. The social, economic, and power
relations of the families involved are the most important factors in the
relationship. Those connections have been very important in these
arrangements, and it is notable that they are cultural.
Kass furthers his biological worries, fearing that prospective parents will
simply ask for a more perfect baby.3 His nightmare is that, if cloning is
available, then when the parents ask for a clone, the provider may try to sell
them up to a more expensive model: "Well now, you realize that there are
further options. You don't have to choose either one of you, you could look in
my cupboard and have a Marilyn Monroe or a Mel Gibson or an Einstein or a
Wilt Chamberlain. Tell me what your dream child is, and we can make it
happen."32 The scenario is genetically seductive, but the problem is that the
clones are merely twins. What the parents end up with will depend on the life
experiences of the clone, especially what happens to them during their first three
years of life. The parents may provide so much stimulation during that critical
early nurturing period that the copy of Wilt may be much brighter than the
original. If so, the young Wilt may find basketball a complete bore, and he will
30. "[WMithout ... the Fiction of Adoption which permits the family tie to be artificially
created, it is difficult to understand how society would ever have escaped from its swaddling clothes,
and taken its first steps toward civilisation." HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 26 (10th ed.
1884).
31. Kass, supra note 1, at 25.
32. Actually, this choice is already available at large in vitro reproduction clinics. Infertile
Couples, supra note 5, at 6A. Cloning apparently would alter the existing situation only slightly.
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curse his parents for saddling him with awkward and uncomfortable height. We
can never be certain of the product of the cloning process in humans, because
the vagaries of socialization constitute such a large variable.
Kass also worries that people may choose whatever is currently in
fashion.3 If cloning were widely available, choosing according to fashion
could become a possibility. There is evidence of that kind of human behavior
at the present time. A relatively trivial example is the way the popularity of
names changes with the generation. Hardly any of the names of my aunts would
be likely to be given to a current baby girl. These fashions change and are even
made the subject of some sociological study. On the other hand, parents may
also consult the list in order to avoid bestowing too common a name on their
offspring.
A more serious example of following fashion is that of gender selection.
In India and China particularly, we are now able to begin to see the results of
choosing boy children. What does a society do with a boy child when there are
ten or fifteen boy children looking for that one female with whom to establish
a mateship? A lot of drones are left over, and China is now struggling with the
social problem of what to do with all those excess males. For the moment, it
clearly is a problem. But it is also a situation that is not going to continue for
the long term. Matters of social choice are self-correcting, because social
choices change in response to new social realities. If parents select the unusual,
the uncommon will become common and, therefore, no longer special. If
parents actually did frequently choose the Marilyn Monroe model, brunettes will
become more unusual and will stand out from the crowd. A temporary
imbalance may occur in social decisions, but, in the long run, such decisions are
self-correcting. Indeed, I find it hard to imagine that, even with such options
available, parents would not return to the traditional model of conception.
Why is it that discussion of cloning so easily leads us off into such genetic
fantasies? I think the explanation lies in the fact that the greatest excitement
about cloning is in commercial animal agriculture. The idea of being able to
reproduce the great race horse, or more importantly the best dairy cow or beef
steer, or the best wool producing sheep is very exciting, because these animals
have significant commercial possibilities. What we must note is that these are
situations in which our evaluation is exclusively genetic. Hence, when we start
33. Kass, supra note 1, at 25.
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talking about human cloning, the genetic focus in the animal kingdom carries
over, and we are misled by our tendency to continue thinking that genes are the
whole picture.'
The genetic fallacy also dominates the popular image of cloning. When
people hear the term "cloning," they think of movie portrayals where the story
is made interesting by having instant full-grown reproductions. They do not
think of producing a twin. This is not a mistake that Kass makes; he recognizes
that a twin baby of the donor will be produced. He worries, however, that
when the child grows up, he may feel genetically cheated, because of his
realization that he is a genetic carbon copy of his dad. Kass thinks that situation
will create problems because of the expectations imposed on the young twin.
Of course, there is always potential for that kind of problem, and it may take
some education for parents to realize how significant the cultural variables are.
But such problems can also arise at present, because people may have to deal
with the pressures of being a junior or perhaps a Charles III, if he were to
become king.
How strong, can we conclude, is the case for criminalizing cloning? Any
evidence of possible harm to the clone is at best highly speculative. Paternalistic
grounds for prohibiting wishful parents from cloning are equally weak. The
secondary harms that supply the basis for much current criminal legislation
simply do not materialize at all in the case of cloning. Public harms? These
can be quite real and of great social importance. But in the case of cloning,
they provide little basis for prohibition. Social-disintegration is a transitory
specter without foundation. The argument from public nuisance rests on
assumptions that humans are mere biological creatures, for whom culture is an
extraneous detail. While it is not possible to conclude that fears of potential
undesirable consequences due to cloning are entirely non-existent, it does seem
clear that those fears are extremely speculative and fall far short of the
threshhold of evidence appropriate for an intrusion of the criminal law into the
realm of freedom and private autonomy.
34. Kass provides an excellent example of this line of thinking:
Scientists who clone animals make it perfectly clear that they are engaged in
instrumental making; the animals are, from the start, designed as means to serve rational
human purposes. In human cloning, scientists and prospective "parents" would be
adopting the same technocratic mentality to human children: human children would be
their artifacts.
Kass, supra note 1, at 23.
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IV. WEIGHING THE COSTS OF RESTRICTING FREEDOM
In comparison with the rather weak reasons for making cloning criminal,
what might the costs to society be of expanding the criminal law in that way?
Do such efforts constitute an irrational fear of scientific research? "Many
editorial pages," according to Tom Teepen who writes for Cox Newspapers,
"seem horrified almost to the point of calling for scientists to be hanged from
the street lamps."' After mentioning Galileo's difficulties with Pope Urban
VIII, Teepen concludes that he thinks "far spookier than the advent of Dolly [the
cloned sheep] is the idea of Congress rushing off from gee-whiz headlines into
the iffy business of passing laws about what scientists may research and what
they may not." Is Teepen overreacting? Even Kass admits that "[tihe proposal
for such a legislative ban is without American precedent, at least in
technological matters . . . . " That same fact is acknowledged by members
of the study panel appointed by President Clinton. They concede that their
recommendation is unprecedented, in that "it would apparently be the first time
that a field of medical research would be prohibited by law."37
President Clinton appointed the panel following his issuance on March 4,
1997, of an executive order prohibiting the use of federal research funds for
cloning of humans. 3 In an administration that has sometimes been noted for
procrastination, the President's action was remarkably swift, coming within ten
days after Dr. Ian Wilmut's announcement that he had cloned Dolly at the
Roslin Institute in Edinburgh, Scotland, on February 23, 1997. The panel
appointed by the President to study the subject is the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission. It was asked to consider whether legislation on the
subject should be recommended. That blue-ribbon panel of eighteen experts has
since reported to the President, recommending legal restrictions on cloning
research. 39 However, panel members are uncertain regarding the wisdom of
imposing legal restrictions. Dr. Harold Shapiro, President of Princeton
University and Chair of the Commission, worries that "[wie don't know whether
the right legislation would be formulated or whether it would.be out of date too
35. Tom Teepen, Go Slow on Anti-cloning Laws, GAINESVILLE SUN, Mar. 12, 1997, at 10A.
36. Kass, supra note 1, at 26.
37. Gina Kolata, Panel: Prohibit Human Cloning, GAINESVILLE SUN, June 8, 1997, at 1A (The
New York Times) (quoting panel member Alexander Morgan Capron, Professor of Law, University
of Southern California).
38. Cloning Bill, supra note 3, at 2B.
39. See Kolata, supra note 37; NATIONAL BIOETHIC ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN
BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1997).
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quickly."'o That concern is probably one of the reasons that the Commission
has proposed a time-limited moratorium restricted to cloning research of entire
humans.
Under the Committee's proposal, "legislation would be crafted so that the
anticloning laws automatically would expire after about three to five years unless
a body of experts, after careful review, decided that the laws should be
maintained."" Undoubtedly, at least some panel members are aware that such
restrictions are much easier to impose in the heat of the present public
excitement than they would be to remove when the interest in the issue has
cooled. It is also possible that the current hysteria has driven the Commission
to propose some limitations, even against its better judgment, in an attempt to
ward off much more damaging restrictions that would be both more inclusive
and not time-limited. In this latter regard, it is notable that the Commission's
proposal is really a compromise. Although cloning that leads to the birth of a
child would be forbidden, at least in the immediate future, experimentation with
cloned human cells in the laboratory would not. One significance of allowing
such cell research to continue is that science would be allowed to try to learn
how to make spare parts, such as tissue that could be used to replace diseased
organs or burned skin.42
But, even with the Commission's attempt at a judiciously limited proposal,
is any kind of legislative interference with scientific exploration feasible or wise?
The principal worry addressed by the Commission seemed to be that, without
legal restriction, private IVF clinics may proceed with cloning attempts.43 That
may be true. But legal restrictions are likely to be futile. If there is sufficient
market demand to drive such experimentation, legal restriction will only push
the clinics off-shore, outside of our legal jurisdiction. Consider as an example
the recent situation of baseball star Rod Carew. His daughter Michelle was
stricken with leukemia. Tragically, a bone marrow match could not be found
for her, and the disease eventually took her life." Can we imagine that the
40. Panel Backs Cloning Moratorium, GAINESVILLE SUN, May 18, 1997, at 7A (The New York
Times).
41. Kolata, supra note 37, at IA, 12A.
42. Paul Recer, Human Cloning Research? GAINESVILLE SUN, June 5, 1997, at IA, 8A (Recer
is an Associated Press science writer). See also Stocking Body Parts: Growth of Animal Organs
Gives Hope for Producing Human Supply, GAINESVILLE SUN, July 23, 1997, at 6A (Associated
Press); Cloned Calf a Step Toward Improved Animals, Science, GAINESVILLE SUN, Aug. 8, 1997,
at 9A (Associated Press).
43. Kolata, supra note 37, at 1A, 12A (The New York Times) (quoting commission member
Dr. Bernard Lo, director of the medical ethics program at the University of California at San
Francisco).
44. See Bill Johnson, He's Plainly Not the Same Rod Carew, ORANGE COUNTRY REG. (Cal.),
Dec. 31, 1995, at BI.
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next time wealthy parents have a child in such a predicament that they would not
turn to an overseas clinic for attempts to clone a twin of the sick child in order
to try to save her? Pushing that research offshore leaves it entirely outside the
existing systems of institutional review and the regulations that would otherwise
govern the operation of such clinics. It is important to remember that we
already have in place a rather elaborate system of institutional review boards and
ethical committees that screen research on human subjects. Because the
members of those review boards are people with training and educational
background in these fields of research, the existing structure of oversight seems
to be a far more appropriate method of scrutinizing scientific projects than
turning the task over to politicians eager to dictate both where research funds
should go and what science should be permitted to explore.
Is there any rational justification for such fears of what scientists might do?
Are they evil or at best amoral individuals in whom any trust would be
misplaced? Dr. Wilmut himself stated that, at the present stage of development
of cloning technology, "[slimilar experiments with humans would be totally
unacceptable. It would be quite inhumane to contemplate using these techniques
at this stage. " ' His reason is that the technology is in such a primitive state
that there would be an unacceptably high number of failures to permit
experimentation in the cloning of entire humans at the present time. Yet Kass
finds it necessary to quote him out of context: "Even Dolly's creator has said
he 'would find it offensive' to clone a human being."' Can that be anything
more than an educated man joining in the public hysteria that provides such a
poor basis for public policy decisions?
Up to this point, Congress has taken no action on the recommendations of
the National Bioethics Advisory Commission. That inaction seems due in part
to disagreement as to whether the Commission's proposals are too moderate.
Majority Leader Dick Armey, who considers himself a libertarian in political
theory, announced an extremely unlibertarian view that the cloning of humans
should be permanently banned. Perhaps a stalemate between various degrees of
unwise intervention may save us from unprecedented interference in scientific
research. However, inaction at the federal level has led to proposals to restrict
cloning in at least twenty-four different states. Given the even lower level of
competence in the state legislatures, we should not be surprised to learn that
many of these bills "are so broadly worded they could also prevent researchers
from using routine techniques for developing new drugs. " ' A variety of
poorly drafted state laws on the subject would constitute "an absolute disaster
45. Sheep Cloner Says Cloning People Would Be 'Inhumane', GAINESVILLE SUN, Mar. 13,
1997, at 3A.
46. Kass, supra note 1, at 19.
47. Cloning Bills Said Too Broad, GAINESVILLE SUN, Mar. 18, 1998, at 9A (Associated Press).
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for medical research," according to Jeff Trewitt, a spokesperson for the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America." Such cautions
remind us of the risks and dangers of permitting political interference in the
conduct of scientific research.
Beyond immediate practical considerations such as those just mentioned, we
should be even more concerned that legislative prohibition of scientific research
raises the specter of the totalitarian subjection of science to politics. Stephen
Chirchett's 1997 London West End play Tom and Clem reminds us of the bitter
fruit of Joseph Stalin's transformation of science into political ideology. To be
sure, legislative proscription of cloning research is not yet a new heresy in the
tradition of the foolishness of Stalin's Lysenko.4 9 But it represents a potential
first step in that direction. Many years ago, reacting directly to that Stalinist
example, s° Michael Polanyi addressed the wisdom of attempting to direct the
work of scientists. His careful analysis showed how self-defeating and
counterproductive are efforts to direct what researchers do.5'
Should we feel tempted to claim that Stalinist despotism cannot happen
here? We should remember that many of the same avowed enemies of cloning
are also conducting campaigns to persuade the Congress and many state
legislatures to adopt requirements that medical personnel distribute pseudo-
scientific "information" pamphlets to women seeking abortions. Such folk are
also frequently busily involved in totalitarian efforts to repress science by
mandating the teaching of so-called "creationism" in public schools. It seems
clear that eternal vigilance is indeed the price of freedom. It also seems
eminently clear that making cloning criminal would entail substantial costs to
society. Expanding the criminal law in that way would endanger much current
48. Id.
49. MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 238 (1958) (reporting that "In August, 1948
Lysenko triumphantly announced to the Academy of Science that his biological views had been
approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and members rose as one man to
acclaim this decision.").
50. Id. at 27, 218 (referring to Lysenko as a "fanatical crank" and as "self-deluded").
51. MICHAEL POLANYi, THE LoGic OF LIBERTY (1951). In Personal Knowledge, Polanyi notes
with sadness that some are "forced to conform to the views of people who are themselves either
dishonest or self-deluded, as Lysenko's followers mostly were." POLANYI, supra note 49, at 218.
My colleague Prof. Frank Allen raised a further important point that restricting scientific inquiry also
deprives us of the benefit of the serendipitous gains of the research, and by definition, we cannot
know in advance what those might be. Letter from Francis A. Allen, Professor Emeritus,
University of Florida College of Law, to Robert C.L. Moffat, Professor of Law and Philosophy,
University of Florida College of Law.
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medical research and threaten the atmosphere of free inquiry essential to the
conduct of basic scientific investigation. Although it may sometimes require
courage to face the mob, we should strenuously resolve to oppose giving in to
the irrational fears that drive the criminalization efforts.
V. EMPOWERING FREEDOM
The law can act with respect to society in four fundamental modes. First,
it can prohibit action, as in the expansion of the criminal law. Second, at the
opposite extreme, the law may require action. Third, the law may also remain
neutral by not regulating conduct. Fourth, in a positive vein, the law can
promote behavior by providing frameworks that facilitate action in pursuit of
human purposes. Even if we are convinced that negative governmental action
with respect to cloning would be unwise, the question remains whether no action
would be preferable to legal encouragement. What possible reason could there
be for the government to facilitate cloning? Cloning technology promises to
produce many important new biomedical discoveries that could provide great
benefits for society. In the few instances noted above, the cloning of entire
humans would benefit the families concerned.
But focusing solely on cloning frames the question too narrowly. The real
question should be: what is the value of adding to the range of legal powers in
order to enhance human freedom? How could cloning figure in that larger
picture? Governmental action might enhance human freedom by facilitating
scientific inquiry through the creation of an environment in which science does
not feel itself under constant threat from outside interference. Cloning is merely
one of a large number of biomedical technologies which, if encouraged, could
enlarge the range of options available. Whether that should be pursued depends
on whether a larger range of freedom is desirable. Whether that is so may
depend on just exactly what we mean by freedom.
Lon Fuller, the late Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard
Law School, conducted a detailed analysis of freedom that may be helpful. He
distinguished between what he termed "freedom from" and "freedom to."52
That distinction is familiar to philosophers, because the noted philosopher Isaiah
Berlin subsequently expressed it as positive and negative liberty.53 Fuller
believed that the concept of freedom had deteriorated in Western society as the
52. Lon Fuller, Freedom--A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305-25 (1955). Fuller's
essay was first presented as a paper at a Conference on Jurisprudence and Politics at the University
of Chicago Law School in April 1954.
53. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-
72 (1969). The essay was delivered as Berlin's Inaugural Lecture at Oxford in October 1958 and
was originally published that year by the Clarendon Press.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss2/8
1998] CLONING FREEDOM 601
focus shifted from freedom to accomplish objectives to freedom from any kind
of restraint. However, "freedom from" provides a false sense of an ideal state
of being, for if one were truly free from all restraint and "had in fact to choose
everything for himself, the burden of choice would become so overwhelming
that choice itself would lose its meaning."' In fact, some form of social order
is necessary to accomplish true freedom, for "in all significant areas of human
action formal arrangements are required to make choice effective. The choices
[one] can make without requiring collaborative social effort for their realization
are trivial."" In many cases, that collaborative social effort takes the form of
the distinct facilitation that law can provide. Hence, he concludes that "freedom
to" is closer to the meaning of true freedom, because it implies a conscious
choice among a meaningful range of alternatives that are actually available. 6
With this helpful distinction in hand, I might now surprise the reader by
declaring my agreement with people like Kass who worry about the explosion
of claims to reproductive freedoms. The reason for my agreement is that such
claims are founded on a rampant individualism, heedless of the interests of
society, that seeks a large surplus of freedom from any kind of restraint. We
need to recognize this phenomenon as a major contemporary social problem.
This society has indulged itself in the notion that human reproduction is an
entirely personal choice in which society has no legitimate interest at all. We
have compounded that error with the idea that children are personal property
with which parents can do as they please, almost without limit. Certainly, in
this view, society has no special interest in seeing that all children have the
requisite environment for successful development. Indeed, it is a striking
challenge to envision any area of life in which we grant a wider range of
freedom from constraint than with decisions concerning fertility and child-
rearing.5 7 However, that abdication of social responsibility is matched by an
equal measure of neglect in the opposite direction. As a society, we provide
very, very little governmental facilitation that would enhance "freedom to" in
these critical domains of the life of our society.
What sort of measures might we as a society take? We could develop
programs on a massive scale that the new research in early childhood
development suggests are necessary.58 Indeed, that new research may develop
54. Fuller, supra note 52, at 1311.
55. Id. at 1312.
56. Id. at 1307-09.
57. See, e.g., Joseph Grcic, The Right to Have Children, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE FAMILY
219-32 (Robert C.L. Moffat et al. eds., 1990).
58. See Nightline: Building Brains-The Sooner, The Better (ABC television broadcast, Apr.
16, 1997) [hereinafter Nightline].
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its own momentum in governmental action because its conclusions are so
clear.59 The results in the pilot programs have been so dramatic that we should
anticipate that they will become a major ingredient in the quest to improve test
scores, because children who have been through these programs are producing
above average scores. One thing to note about these pilot programs is that,
although there is governmental involvement, a mandatory model has not been
employed. Instead, the program is based on a helping model. Every new child
receives a home visit in order to help the parents improve their parenting skills
and to screen to see if they need more follow-up help.' It is important to note
that, though such programs could use governmental coercion to achieve the
desired action, force has not proved necessary to achieve the goals of the
programs. Totalitarian methods have not been needed; noncoercive techniques
are far more effective, because they are organized to take advantage of voluntary
cooperation.
6
'
Nonetheless, because we are so accustomed to unlimited freedom from
constraint in fertility and child-rearing decisions, many will quite likely react
with horror to the suggestion of any restriction on the range of choice we
presently exercise. But change need not necessarily usher in an era of
totalitarian micromanagement of personal decisions. Repeated studies have
shown that, given the opportunity to control fertility, women are eager to do so.
In other words, women have responded with considerable enthusiasm to having
the "freedom to" .control their fertility. In fact, in a number of Western
European countries, the birth rate has fallen so much that governments worry
about lacking sufficient births to maintain population replacement. Those
governments have attempted to devise a variety of schemes that would make
more attractive the exercise by their citizens of their freedom to procreate.
Similarly, in the pilot studies on early childhood development, parents have
proven to be quite receptive to the "freedom to" be provided with assistance in
developing the nurturing skills needed for effective parenting.
59. See STANLEY 1. GREENSPAN, THE GROWTH OF THE MIND AND THE ENDANGERED ORIGINS
OF INTELLIGENCE (1997). See also Marcia Barinaga, New Insights into How Babies Learn
Language, 277 ScI. 641 (1997); B. Devlin et al., The Heritability of IQ, 388 NATURE 468-71
(1997); Matt McGue, The Democracy of the Genes, 388 NATURE 417-18 (1997).
60. The statements in the text refer to the program in Brattleboro, Vermont, which has been
in operation long enough for its "graduates" to be scoring above average on standardized tests in
the second grade. However, "thirty-two states are spending money on early education for children
newborn to three." Nightline, supra note 58.
61. See generally William McBride, Noncoercive Society: Some Doubts, Leninist and
Contemporary, in COERCION 178 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972). On
population policy in particular, see Robert C.L. Moffat, Population, Reciprocity, and Human
Potential, in LAW AND THE ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 111-19 (Eugene E. Dais ed., 1978).
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That receptiveness should not lull us into a sense that such a revolutionary
transformation in the exercise of human freedom would be smooth sailing. For
one thing, it would require an emphatic social rejection of a wide variety of
ardent advocates of freedom from constraint. Take just two of the myriad
possible examples. We could not tolerate the view of some self-styled feminists
who urge unlimited choice to reproduce accompanied by unlimited demand for
public support for their procreation. Nor would there be any room for the anti-
abortionist's passionate defense of unlimited freedom for fetuses. These and
many similar advocacies undercut the cohesion required for effective social
action. If social order is a prerequisite to true freedom, we must marshal all of
our energies to defeat the efforts of such anti-social individualism. Rampant
individualism is the product of a culture which idolizes "freedom from" but
which wishes at the same time to avoid all responsibility for the exercise of
unconstrained freedom.
Defining freedom as such licentiousness has given freedom an undesirable
reputation. It has become associated with those who seek to duck responsibility
for their decisions. Frequently, these "moral Luddites" attempt to avoid
responsibility for their choices by claiming that to exercise conscious choice
would amount to "playing God."' This is offered as an excuse for doing
nothing. Of course, what people overlook about the notion of "playing God"
is that playing God simply means making decisions. The Pickwickian Catch-22
is that deciding not to make a decision is itself a decision. The moral Luddites
wish there were an escape from responsibility for deciding, but there is none.6
Is this a problem which should concern us? Polls indicate that many people are
worried about our "playing God" by engaging in scientific intervention.6
Although in many cases that worry will last only until they have become
accustomed to the idea, we must also recognize an underlying desire to escape
responsibility for making decisions. In other words, the desire represents a
flight from "freedom to." Why? Because the freedom of responsible choice
bears the costs they wish to avoid: making real decisions and accepting their
consequences.
Equally reprehensible are those who idealize science and believe it will
provide the answers to all human problems. They also seek to avoid
responsibility for choice by wishing to allow science to make those decisions.
That view represents a complete misunderstanding of science, because science
62. Kass also worries about people "playing at being God." Kass, supra note 1, at 17.
63. For more extensive treatment, see Robert C.L. Moffat, 'First, Do No Harm': Mixed
Signals in Our Thinking About Life and Death, in SPACES AND SIGNIFICATIONS 109, 117-120
(Roberta Kevelson ed., 1996).
64. Debate Keeps Raging, supra note 7.
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cannot provide a scheme of values nor intelligently guide public policy.'
Science provides us with possibilities. Cloning, as with all previous scientific
breakthroughs, represents potential "freedom to." But public policy must
provide the framework within which that potential can be realized. Those
guidelines both constrain, and effectuate freedom.
Fuller suggests that the framework in which freedom is best realized is in
"a congenial environment of rules and decisions " ' in which individuals are
both informed as to the range of alternatives and the consequences of choosing
various alternatives and allowed to participate in "decisions that affect the
practical significance of [their] freedom."67 In order to carry out such a
vision, we must educate members of our society to enhance their understanding
of the real meaning of freedom. Too much of the current attempt at discourse
obstructs that needed education by interfering with the rational processing of
information. That in turn prevents intelligent participation in both public and
private decisionmaking. To achieve an effective scheme of social ordering, our
society must take a level-headed approach to the possibilities exposed by science
and the problems created by the exercise of freedom from both constraint and
responsibility. A large step in that direction would be a social compact that
individuals will once again take full responsibility for the consequences of their
decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the beginning, I asked if there are pressing reasons to believe that
cloning is a threat of such magnitude that prompt and drastic action is needed.
I believe it is clearly not. The popular and political reaction has been
exaggerated and overblown, and a hurried legal response is unnecessary and
would be unwise. Are there persuasive justifications for restricting freedom by
criminalizing cloning? A detailed canvass of the possible reasons demonstrates
that the reasons fall far short of the threshhold of evidence and argument that an
intelligent society should demand before further expanding the reach of the
criminal law. That case becomes even less persuasive when the extremely weak
advantages of expanding the criminal law are compared with the costs of doing
SO.
Finally, we should consider seriously the strong reasons in favor of
expanding rather than restricting freedom. Empowering our citizens in the
exercise of responsible freedom makes a great contribution to the enhancement
65. See, e.g., Robert C.L. Moffat, The Indispensable Role of Independent Ethical Judgment,
21 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1969).
66. Fuller, supra note 52, at 1314.
67. Id. at 1315.
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of social order. Criminalizing conduct is negative in character and is potentially
damaging to social cohesion," and it should always be our last resort in
responding to social problems. So far as cloning is concerned, the issue itself
is relatively trivial. Its import lies in the larger context: in its consequences for
the atmosphere in which scientific inquiry is conducted, and in the political and
popular attitudes toward the exercise of responsible freedom. Whether we
should be cloning entire humans is not terribly important in itself. But we
clearly should make great efforts to clone freedom.
68. See Robert C.L. Moffat, Consent and the Criminal Law, in CONSENT: CONCEPT,
CAPACITY, CONDITIONS, AND CONSTRAINTS, BEIHEFT NF 12, ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 147-58, 152-56 (Lyman Tower Sargent ed., 1979).
Moffat: Cloning Freedom: Criminalization or Empowerment in Reproductive P
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss2/8
